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LIABILITY INSURANCE: EFFECT OF
FALSE STATEMENTS ON DUTY
TO COOPERATE
ADRIAN P. SCHOONE* AND MICHAEL M. BERZOWSKI**
INTRODUCTION OF THE PROBLEM
Whether and when discrepancies in statements by an insured to
his insurer constitute a breach of the liability insurance cooperation
clause' is the subject of this article. A distinction is drawn at the outset,
between wilful, intentional or fraudulent material variances, here dis-
cussed, and those variances which are unintentional, accidental, unim-
portant or inconsequential. The latter categories are considered not
sufficient to constitute a breach of the clause under discussion.
As a practical matter, the question is fundamentally one of recon-
ciling rights, that is to say:
When the question arises as to whether or not an insured has
breached the cooperation clause, sufficient to relieve the insurer
of liability, courts are confronted with the problem of balancing
the injured third party's interest in recovery and collection as
opposed to the insurance carrier's interest in compliance and
enforcement of the cooperation clause.2
The primary obstacle inherent in the resolution of these opposing in-
terests has been expressed in the following manner:
The clause cannot be interpreted in a way that would make
it a mere device to entrap the insured, or a technicality so arbi-
trarily weighted that without detriment to the insurer in the
performance of its obligation to defend, it wipes out that obliga-
tion, which is the essence of the contract ....
On the other hand, it must be remembered there exists a doctrine,
cloaked with a mantle of "public policy," that an injured party should
be compensated for injury caused by an insured occurring subsequent
to the issuance of the insurance contract. This approach finds support
in the idea that it is somehow unfair to release the insurer from liability
even though the insured has not cooperated, because of the carrier's
receipt of insurance premiums.
* Editor-in-Chief, Marquette Lav Review, 1958-59; Trial Attorney, LaFrance,
Thompson, Greenquist, Evans & Dye, Racine, Wisconsin.
**B.B.A. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (1962); Candidate for J.D. de-
gree, Marquette Law School (1969).
1 The following format for a standard cooperation clause is suggested by
RisjoRD and AuSTIN, AUTOM1[OBILE LiABILrrY CASES, Standard Provisions and
Appendix, at 28 (1964) : "The insured shall cooperate with the company, and
upon the company's request shall attend hearings and trials and shall assist
in effecting settlements, securing and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance
of witnesses and in the conduct of suits."
2 Comment, A Solution to the Inequities Froc a Breach of the Cooperation
Clause in Automobile Liability Insurance, 2 Hous. L. REv. 92, 92-3 (1964).
3 MacClure v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co., 229 N.C. 305, 49 S.E.2d 742, 748
(1948).
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The usual fact situation giving rise to a failure of cooperation issue
occurs ". . . where the insured's statements tended to exculpate him
from blame, leading the insurer to think that it could successfully
defend the suit, and thereafter the insured admitted that the accident
was his fault... ." -4 Alternatively, in some instances, the insured advises
the carrier that he was at fault and subsequently indicates that he was
not. At this point in the litigation, the insurance company is confronted
with the dilemma of defending the suit on the merits of the negligence
issue, and at the same time disclosing that its insured was a prevaricator
of a very material fact bearing on the policy defense.
TRADITIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE COOPERATION CLAUSE
Satisfaction of the cooperation clause of the automobile liability in-
surance policy is generally regarded as a condition precedent 5 to the
liability of the carrier, although there is contrary authority.6 The effect
of this construction is that the insured is required to actively cooperate
with the company in the defense of the action, that is, upon the insurer's
request, the insured must assist in settlements and the conduct of
suits.7 But whether this requirement of active participation is labeled
a condition precedent or a condition subsequent is probably a barren
speculation, since it is a material condition of the policy, the violation
of which destroys the insured's right to claim indemnity thereunder.
Thus "due to certain basic policy considerations the approaches of the
various courts, no matter which standard is applied, tend to produce
similar results."" It is a condition to the right of recovery.9
The acknowledged purpose of the standard cooperation clause in
automobile policies is to protect the insurer from the irresponsibility
of the insured,' 0 to prevent collusion between the insured and a friendly
claimant," and ". . . to put [the] insurer on notice and afford it an
opportunity to make such investigation as it may deem necessary to
properly defend or settle claims which may be asserted. . . ."1 In
general, the insured's responsibility is to assist and aid the insurer in
48 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAW & PRAcICE § 4782, at 140 (1962).
5O'Kelley, The Cooperation Clause As a Condition Precedent, 17 INS. COUNSEL
J. 27 (1950).
6 Id. at 31.
7 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 116 Ga. App. 658, 158 S.E.2d
278 (1967); Ciaccio v. Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 90 R.I. 379,
158 A.2d 277 (1960).8 Note, 23 MD. L. REv. 245, at 249 (1963).
9The Wisconsin Court in Bachhuber v. Boosalis, 200 Wis. 574, 575, 229
N.W. 117 (1930) said: "The provisions in the policy . . .are conditions pre-
cedent. . . ." For a general discussion of the condition precedent doctrine
in Wisconsin, see De Salve v. Howell Plaza, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 167, 156
N.W.2d 473 (1968).
10 56 MIcH. L. REv. 1208 (1958). See also Note, 15 ALA. L. REv. 260 (1963).
11MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sailors, 180 Neb. 201, 141 N.W.2d 846 (1966);
Kraynick v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 72 N.j. Super. 34, 178 A.2d 50 (1962).
121Tenderson v. Rochester Am. Ins. Co., 254 N.C. 329, 118 S.E.2d 885, 887
(1961).
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preparing the case for trial or settlement.1 3 This obligation of the in-
sured to assist and aid the insurer is usually satisfied by the insured's
disclosure to the carrier of the pertinent facts surrounding the circum-
stances of the collision. It should be noted that this aid in preparation
goes to the very crux of the agreement for cooperation between the
parties. This purpose, of securing aid in suit or settlement, is achieved,
as in other contractual undertakings, through the imposition of various
rights and duties upon the parties.
What precisely are these rights and duties and what is meant by
cooperation and disclosure?
The primary duty of the insurance company is to defend the insured
in the ensuing lawsuit, and indemnify him for amounts which he is
obligated to pay as a result of his fault. This is the "old philosophy"
which considers the agreement between insured and insurer as a con-
tract of indemnity for the protection of the insured.14 Conversely, the
insurer is deemed to have the right to know from the insured the facts
upon which the injured person asserts his claim, in order to determine
for itself whether it should contest or attempt to settle. The company
is entitled to an honest statement by the insured of the pertinent cir-
cumstances surrounding the accident, as he remembers them, and this
statement should divulge all material and relevant facts. 5 Of course,
"cooperation does not mean that the assured is to combine with the
insurer to present a sham defense." 16
The disclosure duty of the insured is generally expressed in varying
degrees of truthfulness. Examples are: "full, fair, complete, and truth-
ful disclosure of facts known to him relative to the accident ;,"17 "fair
and frank disclosure of information reasonably demanded ;""' and giving
"in good faith a truthful statement of the accident."' 9
13 American Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. Diamond, 1 N.Y. 2d 594, 136 N.E.2d 876 (1956).
1456 MIcH. L. REv. 1208 (1958). See also James and Thornton, Impact of
Insurance on Law of Torts, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 431 (1950) for de-
velopment of philosophy that insurance is a contract of liability and public
policy demands its enforcement on behalf of innocent third parties. But cf.
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Watson, 61 F.2d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 1932): "The
contract of insurance was issued for the protection of the assureds against
loss; it was not designed for the protection of strangers." See also Keeton,
Ancillary Rights of the Insured Against His Liability Insurer, 28 INs.
COUNSEL J. 395 (1961).
IsUnited States Cas. Co. v. Schlein, 338 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1964); Car &
General Ins. Corp. v. Goldstein, 179 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
'
0 VANCE, HANDBOOK ON LAW OF INsURANCE § 196, at 1003 (2d ed. 1951);
Adopted by Wisconsin Supreme Court in Jenkinson v. New York Cas. Co.,
241 Wis. 328, 6 N.W.2d 192 (1942).
17 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Gordon, 116 Ga. App. 658, 158 S.E.2d
278, 279 (1967); See also Tillman v. Great Am. Indem. Co. of N.Y., 207 F.2d
588, 591 (7th Cir. 1953).lsPrudence Mutual Casualty Co. v. Dunn, 30 Ill. App. 2d 469, 175 N.E.2d 286,
287 (1961).
29 Ciaccio v Norfolk & Dedham Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 90 R.I. 379, 158 A.2d 277,
280 (1960).
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In essence, the cooperation clause binds the insured to the exercise
of good faith, and when he speaks concerning the facts of the accident,
he must speak the truth °.2  As summarized by the Federal Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Home Indemnity Co. of N. Y. v.
Standard Acc. Ins. Co.:
Truthfulness seems to be the keystone of the cooperation
arch. The insured must tell his insurer the complete truth con-
cerning the accident, and he must stick to this truthful version
throughout the proceedings. He must not embarrass or cripple
his insurer in its defense against a civil suit arising out of the
accident, by switching from one version to another, he must not
blow hot and cold to suit his personal convenience.2
Thus in the construction of the clause there is a requirement that an
honest disclosure be made, no matter who is helped or hurt.22 "It is
basic that an insurer cannot determine whether there is a defense to
a claim if the assured does not give it a complete and accurate state-
ment of the cause, condition and circumstances of the accident."23 The
importance of this idea cannot be overemphasized since "If insurers
may not contract for fair treatment and helpful cooperation by the
insured, they are practically at the mercy of the participants in an
automobile collision."24
Though the rules are quite easily stated in the abstract, practical
application of them in current litigation presents several problems. The
primary obstacle is the growing public policy interest of the law that
an injured party be compensated for his injury.2 5 The essence of this
philosophy, as stated in Kurz v. Collins26 is:
[W]here the rights of an injured third party have intervened
subsequent to the issuance of the contract of insurance, the in-
surer should not be freed from liability to such third party, on
the ground of noncooperation of the insured in having made a
false statement, unless the insurer has been harmed thereby.
In addition to the assumed undesirability of an injured party not
being compensated, some authorities argue that because the insurer
has been collecting premiums for the risk assumption, it should indem-
20 Home Indem. Co. of N.Y. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 919 (9th
Cir. 1948).
21 Id. at 924. See also United States Cas. Co. v. Schlein, 338 F.2d 169 (5th Cir.
1964); Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Dennis, 203 F. Supp. 482 (W.D. Ky.
1962); State Farm 'ut. Ins. Co. v. Wendler, 116 Ga. App. 452, 154 S.E.2d
772 (1967) ; Report of Automobile Insurance Committee, 16 INs. COUNSEL J.
50 (1949).
22 Salonen v. Paanenen, 320 Mass. 568, 71 N.E.2d 227 (1947).
23 Close, Notice and Breach of Cooperation Requirements, in LIABILITY INSUR-
ANCE DISPUTES 2-39 (Schreiber ed. 1968).
24 Watkins v. Watkins, 210 Wis. 606, 613, 245 NAV. 695 (1933).
25 Foote v. Douglas County, 29 Wis. 2d 602, 139 N.W.2d 628 (1966) ; Stippich v.
Morrison, 12 Wis. 2d 331, 107 N.VW1.2d 125 (1961); Kurz v. Collins, 6 Wis. 2d
538, 95 N.W.2d 365 (1959).
20 6 Wis. 2d 538, 549, 95 N.W.2d 365 (1959).
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nify irrespective of the action of its insured. The insurer, in effect,
becomes a substitute for the insured even though the insurer is not the
perpetrator of the tort. Considering that an injured party need not
recover against the carrier, assuming a solvent tortfeasor-insured, it
could be suggested that any recovery obtained from the insurer in
situations wherein the insured has less than fully cooperated, constitutes
a "windfall" to the injured third party. Nevertheless, the policy of com-
pensating the injured party, and concomitant construction of the con-
tract as an agreement for the benefit of the general public, is in vogue.
This tendency was judicially expressed in a comparatively recent case
as follows:
The duty of the court is to be alert to protect insurers in cir-
cumstances where close family relationship or association tend
to ally the sympathy of the insured to those with whom the
insured may be liable, and normally, in evaluating credibility,
such factors are taken into account. We must, on the other
hand, recognize that insurance policies protect not only the in-
sured, but the general public .... 27 (emphasis added)
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Keller,y2 this public policy approach was
stated by an Illinois appellate court in the following language:
... it is apparent that a contract of insurance is of vital con-
cern to all who own and operate such vehicles, to their passen-
gers, and to all who venture forth as mere pedestrians. It [the
contract of insurance] is not just an agreement limited to the
parties but by its very nature has become one cloaked with a
public interest.
STATEMENTS HELD TO BE A SUFFICIENT BREACH OF THE CLAUSE
UNDER DIFFERING JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF CONSTRUCTION
False or variant statements sufficient to breach the cooperation
clause have been as varied as the imagination. Some common examples
are: indentity of the driver at the time of the collision,29 valid per-
mission to operate the vehicle,30 mechanical condition of the vehicle,
3
1
speed,32 consumption of intoxicants, 33 cause of collision,3 4 and mainte-
27 Upshaw v. Great American Indem. Co., 112 So. 2d 125, 130 (La. Ct. App.
1959).
28 17 Ill. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 482, 484 (1958).
29 Drennan v. Wren, 416 S.W.2d 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) ; Sutera v. Provident
Ins. Co. of N.Y., 67 N.J. Super. 554, 171 A.2d 340 (1961) ; State Farm Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Brown, 21 App. Div. 2d 742, 250 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1964); Schauf v.
Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 36 Wis. 2d 480, 153 N.W.2d 510 (1967).
30 Motorists 'Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 218 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. App. 1966) ; General
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grempel, 17 App. Div. 2d 650, 230 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1962);
Foote v. Douglas County, 29 Wis. 2d 602, 139 N.W.2d 628 (1966).
31 Epstein v. Erie Indem. Co., 39 Pa. D. & C. 117 (1940).
32 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wendler, 115 Ga. App. 452, 154 S.E.2d
774 (1967) ; Broussard v. Broussard, 84 So. 2d 899 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
33 United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Watts, 370 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Hunt v.
Dollar, 224 Wis. 48, 271 NAV. 405 (1937).
34 Car and General Ins. Corp. v. Goldstein, 179 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
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nance of proper lookout. 35 Whether such statements breached the
clause in a given case depended upon the particular time at which the
statement was made, the spirit in which made, i.e., good faith, and the
philosophy adopted by the particular court in solving issues of this
nature. The principle developed from past decisions has been sum-
marized as follows:
An insured's willful and avowed obstruction by insured's
efforts to defend an action brought against an insured will con-
stitute a breach of the insured's contract's [sic] duty to cooperate,
which breach, if material, and/or prejudicial will discharge in-
surer from liability under the policy.3 6
The broad rule has been subjected to diverse judicial interpretation in
the determination of whether a breach occurred and if it was prejudicial.
Three standards have been adopted by the courts in gauging the degree
of non-compliance sufficient to relieve the insurer of liability. These
tests are the prejudice standard, the material breach standard and the
presumption of prejudice standard.3 7
The Prejudice Standard
The prejudice standard philosophy, followed by a majority of the
courts, requires the insurer to prove that it was substantially prejudiced
as a result of the insured's breach. This approach subscribes to the
theory that the insurer has the burden of establishing that there was a
breach of the policy provision. In this situation the insurer must show
a high degree of non-compliance before the burden of proof shifts to
the party asserting lack of prejudice. It must be remembered that
substantial prejudice must be shown. In other words, if there are no
valid substantive defenses to the claimant's action, the insured's failure
of cooperation is deemed harmless and not substantial non-compliance
nor prejudicial. The ". . . more recent cases clearly indicate that the
insured's . . . non-cooperation must, on some conjectural or probability
basis, have left the insurer 'less able to resist a claim against its in-
sured .. ' ."38 However, in some jurisdictions actual prejudice must
be shown ;39 the "possibility of prejudice to the insurer will not be suffi-
cient for a finding of non-cooperation as a matter of law when the
rights of an injured third party have arisen.' ' 40 Under these circum-
stances, "actual" as opposed to theoretical or suppositious prejudice41
must be shown. This approach places on the insurer the burden of
National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Austin, 23 App. Div. 776, 258 N.Y.S.2d
439 (1965).
3 Yuenshee v. London Guar. & Acc. Co., 40 Hawaii 213 (1953).
36 Pretzel, What Price Cooperation?, 1966 INs. LAWJ . 325, 326.
37 See Comment, supra note 2 for discussion of various standards.
38 Pretzel, supra note 36, at 329.
3a Foote v. Douglas County, 29 Wis. 2d 602, 139 N.W.2d 628 (1966).
40 Id. at 608, 139 N.W.2d at 631.
41 Stippich v. Morrison, 12 Wis. 2d 331, 107 N.W.2d 125 (1961).
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proving an unknown quantity, the existence of which is at best only
conjectural. 42 Regardless of the test imposed, whether actual or theo-
retical prejudice, it is submitted that some prejudice exists in every
case in which an insured relates false versions of the incident to his
carrier or its attorneys. In any such case, disadvantages to the insurer
arise in preparation and defense of a suit commenced by the injured
party.43 This problem has been expressed as follows:
When the true facts were disclosed, the company had to exactly
reverse its position with regard to essential facts and virtually
proclaim their parties and chief witnesses to be liars and wholly
unworthy of belief. Practically its only props were struck from
under it.
Moreover had the insurer proceeded to defend on behalf of
its assured, it faced the spectre of having its principal witnesses
denounced in open court as perjurers in view of the 'about face'
in their stories. .. .4
The detrimental effect of an insured's varying version of the facts
surrounding the alleged tort is further amplified by present day liberal
discovery rules. Since counsel can ask witnesses on cross-examination
if they have given statements of the facts of the accident to anyone and
if answered in the affirmative these statements must be produced,-
the possibility of complete destruction of the insured's credibility arises,
even though the carrier is apprised of the breach prior to the litigation.
The jury thus learns that the witness had not told the truth in the
first instance,46 and the variation in statements can result in the loss
of the insured's credibility as a defense in the action brought by the
injured party against him.
As summarized in Buffalo v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., ". . . the company is deprived of the opportunity to negotiate a
settlement, or to defend upon the solid ground of fact. Nothing is more
dangerous than a client who deliberately falsifies the facts."'47
The Material Breach Standard
The material breach standard requires the insured to carry the
burden of proving compliance with the terms of the contract, once the
42 Comment, supra note 2, at 97-8.
43 Quisenberry v. Kartsonis, 297 S.W.2d 450 (Mo. 1956).
44 Home Indem. Co. of N.Y. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. 167 F.2d 919, 926-7 (9th
Cir. 1948).
45 Shaw v. Wuttke, 28 Wis. 2d 448, 137 N.W.2d 649 (1965) ; Jacobi v. Podevels,
23 Wis. 2d 152, 127 N.W.2d 73 (1964); Kurz v. Collins, 6 Wis. 2d 538, 95
N.W.2d 365 (1959). See also, Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 12 (1960); Annot., 22
A.L.R.2d 659 (1951).
46 Commented upon by the court in Allegretto v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 140
Ore. 538, 13 P.2d 647 (1932).
47 84 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1936) ; Hall v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. of N.Y.,
204 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1953); Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Dennis, 203
F. Supp. 482 (W.D. Ky. 1962). See also Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Griffin,
178 F. Supp. 678 at 681 (S.D. Tex. 1959) : "[The insurer] was deprived ...
of the truth, a weapon of the greatest value in investigating or attempting to
settle litigation of this nature."
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insurer has shown that a breach has occurred .4  This approach sub-
scribes to the theory that the cooperation clause is a condition precedent
to the liability of the insurer. Unlike the prejudice standard approach,
the question of prejudice or detriment to the carrier resulting from the
breach is immaterial, as is the fact that compliance with the clause
would not have aided the insurer.
The leading case adopting this test was Coleman v. New Amsterdam
Casualty Co.4' This case involved a druggist, insured against liability
for mistake, who refused to state the details of a mistake for which he
was sued unless the insurer would promise to pay any amount for
which the druggist was found liable. The court, after recognizing the
fact that the insurer would have been no better off if the insured had
made the truthful disclosure, said, "Cooperation with the insurer is one
of the conditions of the policy. When the condition was broken, the
policy was at an end. .. .
The jurisdictions applying the material breach test favor a more
strict construction of the insurance contract. The vital consideration
therefore appears to be the degree of materiality ascribed to the insured's
misrepresentations. The court in Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v.
Griffin" held that: "Conduct of the two assureds, which was designed
to cause the insurer to defend the State court proceeding under a
complete misapprehension of a highly important fact, can hardly be
characterized as insubstantial. . .. -52 Thus to satisfy the test in a
jurisdiction using the material breach standard, the significant con-
sideration appears to be the relative degree of non-compliance of the
insured in relating the facts to the carrier.5 3 Prejudice to the carrier
is not required, although it would probably be present in the case of a
material breach.
The jurisdictions favoring this approach have adopted a more literal
interpretation of the contract between the carrier and the insured. A
frequent criticism of this theory is that it permits an insurer to escape
liability on technical grounds, and in effect render a nullity that which
is the essence of the contract. 54 But, the ". . . harshness of this view is
however, mitigated by the fact that many of these courts speak in terms
48 See, e.g., Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 241 A.2d 207 (N.H. 1968).
49247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367 (1928).50 Id. at 276.
51 178 F. Supp. 678 (S.D. Tex 1959). See also Car & General Ins. Corp. v. Gold-
stein, 179 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Imperiali v. Pica, 338 Mass. 494,
156 N.E.2d 44 (1959) ; Quisenberry v. Kartsonis, 297 S.W.2d 450 (Mo. 1956) ;
Glen Falls Indem. Co. v. Keliher, 88 N.H. 253, 187 A. 473 (1936) for ex-
amples of material breach discussion.
52 178 F. Supp. 678, 680 (S.D. Tex 1959).
53 E.g., in United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Watts, 370 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1966) it
was held that the failure of the insured to tell the truth in regard to beer
drinking activities for 18 months and until just before the trial was a ma-
terial misrepresentation sufficient to work a breach.
54 Comment, supra note 2, at 98.
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of 'material non-compliance.' ,5 Therefore, this hedge in interpretation
would probably operate to preclude a carrier's escape from liability in
cases wherein release would tend to be unconscionable or against
ccpublic policy" as determined by the particular court.
The Presumption of Prejudice Standard
The presumption of prejudice standard, which represents the minor-
ity view,50 presumes that prejudice exists once a breach has been proved
by the insurer. 57 In these jurisdictions, the burden is on the insured to
rebut the presumption and show that in fact his non-compliance did
not result in prejudice to the carrier. If the insured can overcome the
presumption, the case will proceed on the substantive merits.
This test is primarily of historical interest, since in the recent case
of Campbell v. Allstate Insurance Co., 8 the California Court decided
to abandon this standard, which it alone had previously espoused:
No statutory basis for the presumption of prejudice has been
cited or found, and presumptions should not be created judcially
unless there are compelling reasons for doing so .... The pre-
sumption would not be in keeping with the public policy of this
state to provide compensation for those negligently injured in
automobile accidents through no fault of their own.5 9
In referring to the Valladao60 case, the Campbell court mentioned
that in that case, prejudice had been established by facts proved and
that it was therefore unnecessary to determine whether a showing of
prejudice should be required.
Thus, as a result of the Campbell case, it appears that litigants
throughout the county will now be confronted with either the material
breach or the prejudice standard in cases involving breaches of the
cooperation clause.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Regardless of which test is adopted, certain variables exist which
are incapable of precise determination, such as the good and bad faith
of the carrier and insured. For example, it could be surmised that an
irresponsible insured or one guilty of intentional misstatement would
probably not receive the same consideration as an insured who gave an
unintentionally erroneous version of the facts. Similarly, a distinction
could be drawn between a carrier with a legitimate policy defense and
one attempting to avoid liability because of a mere technicality. In other
words, some weight must be assigned to certain intangibles in the bal-
ancing of the rights of the respective parties.
Although it is difficult to determine with precision the outcome in
55 Note, 23 MD. L. REv. 245, 247 (1963).
56 Valladao v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 13 Cal. 2d 322, 89 P.2d 643 (1939).
57 Ibid.
58 32 Cal. Rptr. 827, 384 P.2d 155 (1963).
50 Id. at 829, 384 P.2d at 157.60 Valladao v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 13 Cal. 2d 322, 89 P.2d 643 (1939).
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a specific fact situation, there appears to be a growing proclivity favor-
ing recovery for the injured party. Courts are increasingly reluctant to
deny recovery even though an insured has less than fully cooperated,
when an otherwise innocent party will go uncompensated for his loss.6 1
Some writers have concluded that there exists a notion that it is "open
season" on insurance companies and that all means are justified in
effecting recovery from the carrier.62 How this judicial attitude squares
with the written insurance contract presumably circumscribing the
carrier's contractual obligation is not clear in some of the opinions. It
might be hypothesized that the underlying theory is that all injured per-
sons should be compensated.
The cumulative effect of these views may favor the prevaricator
and injured party at the expense of the casualty insurer issuing a policy
containing rather explicit terms. This sometimes results in a better
contract for the parties than they chose to make for themselves.6 3 How-
ever, this approach may constitute a two-edged sword for the general
public, as the following comment demonstrates:
It [the contract of insurance] is not just an agreement limited
to the parties but by its very nature has become one cloaked
with a public interest. Integrity should be the essence of the
agreement. The cost of insurance is based upon the ratio of
claims paid to the risk written. It is the owners and operators
of vehicles upon whom the financial burden of maintaining such
contracts must ultimately fall. . . .The courts cannot condone
or support a doctrine that might ultimately make the cost of
insurance protection prohibitive. Compliance with its terms is,
therefore, vital to all who may benefit, either directly or in-
directly, from its provisions.64
Perhaps compensation for the injured party should not be the
primary consideration in balancing the equities in all cases. If the
insured cannot bring himself within the conditions of the policy, should
his insurer be nevertheless obliged to indemnify him and redress the
injured victim?
EFFECT OF FALSE STATEMENTS ON COVERAGE IN WISCONSIN
The Wisconsin decision long relied upon by insurers when raising
policy defenses based upon non-cooperation is Hunt v. Dollar.65 In
61 Note, 1950 WAsH. U. L. Q. 235.
62 Dudgeon, Liability Insurance: The Insured's Duty to Cooperate, 34 NEB. L.
REav. 250 (1955).63The New York court citing Coleman v. New Amsterdam Gas. Go., in Home
Indem. Co. of N.Y. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 919, 929 stated the
converse of this proposition: [A]nd if the insured cannot bring himself
within the conditions of the policy, he is not entitled to recover for the loss.
In short, the law does not make a better contract for the parties than they
chose to make for themselves."
64 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller, 17 Ill. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E.2d 482, 484 (1958).
See also Pawlik v. Nichols, 195 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Ill. 1961); Galloway v.
Schied, 72 Ill. App. 2d 116, 219 N.E.2d 718, 722 (1966) ; Western States Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. May, 18 Ill. App. 2d 442, 152 N.E.2d 608 (1958).65 224 Wis. 48, 271 N.W. 405 (1937).
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that case, after first joining with the insured in an answer denying the
insured's negligence, the insurer obtained leave of court, upon notice
with supporting affidavits, to file a supplemental answer alleging that
(1) the insured made false and untrue statements as to the material
facts; (2) the insured induced witnesses to make false and untrue
written statements as to material facts; and (3) the insured himself
falsely testified on adverse examination as to the material facts of the
accident. The issues thus raised were tried separately by a jury. The
false statements, which were made in written reports of the accident
to the insurer and in adverse examination, were concerned with the
extent of the insured's drinking. He said that he had not been drinking
prior to the accident when in fact he had consumed considerable
intoxicants.
The Supreme Court affirmed the action of the trial court in granting
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, dismissing the complaint as to
the insurer. The reason given for the affirmance was that the false
statements violated the express conditions of the policy requiring dis-
closure of information and full cooperation. The court stated that: "In
cases of breach of condition it is immaterial whether the breach in
fact prejudices the insurer." 66
Quoting from the leading New York case of Coleman v. New
Amsterdam Casualty Co., 67 Justice Fowler said:
The plaintiff makes the point that the default should be con-
doned since there is no evidence that cooperation, however will-
ing, would have defeated the claim for damages or diminished
its extent. For all that appears the insurer would be no better
off if the assured had kept its covenant, and made disclosure
full and free. The argument misconceives the effect of a refusal.
Cooperation with the insurer is one of the conditions of the
policy. When the condition was broken, the policy was at an end,
if the insurer so elected. The case is not one of the breach of a
mere covenant, where the consequences may vary with the fluc-
tuations of the damage. There has been a failure to fulfill a
condition upon which obligation is dependent. 68 (emphasis added)
Thus in this case the court appeared to have adopted the so-called
material breach standard. The test was whether or not a condition of
the contract was breached. The court did not consider whether the
insurer was actually prejudiced by the false statements.
The Hunt case was followed in Hoffman v. Labutzke,6 9 wherein the
insured, after the trial, stated to the trial attorney for both defendants
that his testimony was false, as was his statement to the insurer im-
mediately following the accident and his sworn statement made during
66 Id. at 54, 271 N.W. at 408. "
6 7247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367, 369 (1928).
68 224 Wis. 48, 54, 271 N.W. 405 (1937).
09 233 Wis. 365, 289 N.W. 652 (1940).
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the adverse examination. The court, citing Hunt v. Dollar, said that the
cooperation clause was specifically made a condition of the policy and
that ". . . breach of conditions voids the policy." 70 The material breach
standard was again followed.
But in the more recent case of Kurz v. Collins,7 1 where the insured
falsely stated in writing, on two different occasions, that he was the
driver of the automobile when in fact a learner was driving at the time
of impact with a pedestrian, the court modified the rule of the Hunt
case.
In laying the foundation for a failure of cooperation grounded upon
variance in statements made by the insured, it was said that the vari-
ance must not only be material, but also conscious, that there must be
a deliberate and wilful falsification. After setting forth the deliberate
and wilful falsification requirements, the court distinguished the role
of the jury and the court in cases of this nature. The former has the
duty of determining whether the alleged false statement or testimony
was consciously made, while the latter is charged with the responsibility
of determining whether the statement or testimony is material. At this
point in the opinion, the following comment regarding the Hunt case
and materiality was made:
When it is stated that a false statement or testimony must be
material in order to breach a policy cooperation condition, it
means that the same must be material to the issue of the liability
of the company on its policy. In a sense, whether a false state-
ment or testimony is material to the insurance company's lia-
bility on its policy is closely akin to whether the company has
been prejudiced thereby, but we deem materiality to be broader
in scope than prejudice. In Hunt v. Dollar ... this court stated,
"In cases of breach of condition it is immaterial whether the
breach in fact prejudices the insurer." We consider this declara-
tion to have been unintentionally misleading. It is apparent from
the context in which such sentence appears in the opinion that
what the court was attempting to say was that it is immaterial
that the insurer was not in fact prejudiced.7 2
The court then observed that the possibility of the prior false state-
ments being used on trial for impeachment purposes existed, but said
that :
...we cannot view the issue solely from the standpoint of the
two contracting parties, the insurer and the insured. The interests
of third parties who have been injured or damaged as a result
of the negligent operation of the insured vehicle must also be
considered.
73
70 Id. at 375, 289 N.W. at 656.
71 6 Wis. 2d 538, 95 N.W.2d 365 (1959).72 Id. at 546-7, 95 N.W.2d at 370.
73 Id. at 549, 95 N.W.2d at 371.
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The court then concluded that:
•,. public policy requires that, where the rights of an injured
third party have intervened subsequent to the issuance of the
contract of insurance, the insurer should not be freed from lia-
bility to such third party, on the ground of non-cooperation of
the insured in having made a false statement, unless the insurer
has been harmed thereby.
74
This issue of harm the court refused to determine on motion for sum-
mary judgment.
Exactly how this interpretation of public policy squared with the
philosophy in Watkins v. Watkins7 5 that ". . . if the insurers may not
contract for fair treatment and helpful cooperation by the insured,
they are practically at the mercy of the participants in an automobile
collision" is not clear. In any event, Kurz appears to mark the adoption
by Wisconsin of the prejudice standard in deciding cooperation cases
of this nature.
The Kurz case was cited in Polar Mfg. Co. v. Integrity Mut. Ins.
Co.,76 a case in which the controversy centered around the insured's
erroneous answers in the policy application for fire insurance. The
court, citing Kurz, said:
[T]his court held the question of whether there has been a
breach of a co-operation clause of an insurance policy because of
false statements by the insured presents a mixed question of law
and fact, although sometimes the facts are so clear that there
is no issue to submit to a jury.77
The difficulty with the comment is that no guidelines were furnished
to determine at what point the issue would be taken from the trier of
fact.
In Stippich v. Morrison,7 the court affirmed the Kurz public policy
holding in the following words:
The mere possibility of prejudice having resulted to the
insurer from a breach of condition of the policy by the insured
is insufficient to prevent an adjudication that such breach was
material where the rights of an injured third person have inter-
vened. An actual showing of prejudice is required. 9
The court then overruled Heimlich v. Kees Appliance Co.80 which had
held that an insurer is relieved of liability for breach of condition by
the insured occurring after the rights of an injured third person have
intervened, without the necessity of showing any resulting prejudice or
harm.
74 Id. at 549, 95 N.W.2d at 371.
75 210 Wis. 606, 613, 245 N.W. 695, 698 (1933).
76 11 Wis. 2d 105, 104 N.W.2d 164 (1960).
77 Id. at 108, 104 N.W.2d at 166.
79 12 Wis. 2d 331, 107 N.W.2d 125 (1961).
79 Id. at 336, 107 N.W.2d at 127.
80 256 Wis. 356, 41 N.W.2d 359 (1950).
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Kurz was also cited in Schneck v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins.
Co., 8I a case involving a question of permission for use of a family
automobile. The insured's daughter allowed a friend to drive the ve-
hicle and it was involved in a collision. The carrier contended that the
father had violated the cooperation clause by deliberately and wilfully
changing his story between the time his signed statement was taken
and the time the complaint (in the daughter's action) was filed. In
this case, the father had given an unsworn statement to the defendant's
adjuster that the daughter was never to allow anyone else to drive
the automobile. This statement was attached to the Safety Responsi-
bility Report,8 2 SR-21, filed by the insurer with the Wisconsin Motor
Vehicle Department. In the complaint, however, the father stated that
the vehicle was being used by the friend with the permission and con-
sent of the father.
In response to the carrier's contention, the court said: "Unless the
testimony of [the father] at the trial was substantially contradictory
to the information given to the defendant in the investigation, there
would be no breach of contract for lack of cooperation. 18 3 The court
pointed out, as in previous cases: ". . the defendant needed to show
it has been harmed by the alleged breach of the policy through lack
of cooperation. In the absence of such a showing, the insurer is not
relieved of liability to third parties." 84
It is submitted that there is some harm in most cases in which an
insured relates false or inconsistent versions of the collision to the
insurer. This conclusion is reached because of current discovery pro-
ceedings. In the recent case of Jacobi v. Podevels, 5 the insured
had given a statement relating the facts of the accident to the carrier's
adjuster a few days after the accident, before any action had been
commenced or was imminent, and before counsel had been assigned
to advise and defend the insured.
The court, in citing Kurz, recognized the importance of the in-
sured's statement when it said:
A statement of the kind under consideration will ordinarily
be used by the insurer . . . to determine whether and on what
basis adjustment of any claim shall be attempted. . . . Whether
the accident under consideration involves clear, doubtful, or no
liability . . . or otherwise indirectly involve[s] the personal
interests of the insured, is often unknown at this stage.
When the insured makes such a statement he is ordinarily
fulfilling a condition of his policy, requiring him to notify the
insurer of the occurrence and circumstances of the accident and
8118 Wis. 2d 566, 119 N.W.2d 342 (1963).
82 Wis. STAT. §§ 344.12 et. seq. (1965).
83 18 Wis. 2d 566, 576, 119 N.W.2d 342 (1963).
84 Id. at 576, 119 N.W.2d at 348.
85 23 Wis. 2d 152, 127 N.W.2d 73 (1964).
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to cooperate with the insurer. If the statement be false, the
insurer may use it against the insured as a foundation for a
claim of non-cooperation.88
Upon the trial, during cross-examination of Jacobi, opposing coun-
sel demanded and obtained Jacobi's prior statement and used it in
cross-examination. The rationale of the decision was that "the judicial
system and rules of procedure should provide litigants with full access
to all reasonable means of determining the truth.18 7 It should be noted
that this procedural rule lays the foundation for the impeachment and
perhaps destruction of the credibility of the carrier's witness in cases
where the insured gives erroneous versions of the facts at any stage
of the litigation. Although it may be speculated that opposing counsel
may not avail himself of the benefits of this discovery rule, should the
carrier be exposed to the risk?
The scope of these discovery procedures was enlarged in Shaw v.
Wuttke,88 wherein the rule as to access to documents and files was
extended to the attorney's work product. In that case, the court stated:
We hold the immunity of the attorney's work product in respect
to a written statement ceases to exist when the person making
the statement is placed on the stand as a witness at the trial.
By becoming a witness the person subjects himself to the risks
of impeachment and the attorney has had the benefit of his work
product.8 9
It would seem, therefore, that under the Podevels and Wuttke
cases, where a conflicting or false statement is made to the carrier
or its attorney, there may be a finding of harm or detriment to the
carrier.
Another recent Wisconsin case grounded upon inconsistent or un-
truthful statements and the related lack of cooperation is Foote v.
Douglas County. 0 In that case, the insured had originally given a
signed statement to the carrier's representative to the effect that the
car involved was not to be driven without the insured's permission.
At the trial, the insured repudiated the statement, and the jury found
that there was an implied consent to operation of the vehicle, and that
the insured had not failed to cooperate with the insurer. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court affirmed and said that ".... in the case at bar, the
insurer offered no proof to show how it was harmed by the ... change
in their stories. We must acknowledge that this was no mere gentle de-
flection . . ., it was a head-over-heels somersault.""' The court then
alluded to the Kurz public policy doctrine and stated:
88 Id. at 156, 127 N.W.2d at 75-6.
87 Id. at 156-57, 127 N.W.2d at 76.
88 28 Wis. 2d 448, 137 N.W.2d 649 (1965).
89 Id. at 456, 137 N.W.2d at 653.
11 29 Wis. 2d 602, 139 N.W.2d 628 (1966).91 ld. at 607, 139 N.W.2d at 631.
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Thus, even though there is a possibility of prejudice to the
insurer, it will not be sufficient to require a finding of non-
cooperation as a matter of law when the rights of an injured
third party have arisen; actual prejudice must be shown by the
insurance company.92 (emphasis added)
The court went on to say:
... it appears that the insurer knew well in advance of the trial
the extent of its insured's deviation. Under such circumstances,
the trial court was justified in accepting the jury's determina-
tion that there was no failure to cooperate. The existence of
prejudice to the carrier was not established.9 3
The foregoing cases and conflicts among them appear to have been
distilled by Schauf v. Badger State Mutual Casualty Co. 4 In that
case, several weeks after the collision, the insured gave a signed state-
ment to his insurer stating that he was driving. Subsequently, upon
the receipt of an "excess letter" after suit was commenced and before
adverse examination, the insured denied in another signed statement
given to the insurer that he was the driver. He further admitted that
he and the other occupants of the automobile decided upon the earlier-
related false story because he carried liability insurance and the person
actually driving did not.
In the trial court, the insurer amended its answer to allege a policy
coverage defense based upon the insured not being the driver and a
policy defense based upon the non-cooperation of the insured in mak-
ing false statements. The insurer upon its amended pleading and af-
fidavits then moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
This motion was denied by the trial court. As to the policy defense,
the trial court thought that there was only a possibility or a mere
contingency of some harm to the insurer which might never occur and
this possibility of harm did not warrant a summary judgment.
The opinion on appeal was delivered by Chief Justice Hallows. It
professed to follow the Kurz rationale that when third parties' rights
had intervened, a breach of the cooperation clause was not a defense
unless the insured was harmed or prejudiced. The court acknowledged
that this harm cannot be determined until the trial of the negligence-
liability issue because the materiality of the alleged breach is measured
in relation to the issue of the liability of the insurer on its policy. The
logic supporting this position was:
If the insured is not found liable because he was not negligent,
the insurer is not liable on his policy and the lack of coopera-
tion was not in fact prejudicial or harmful and therefore not ma-
92 Id. at 608, 139 N.W.2d at 631.
93 Id. at 608, 139 N.W.2d at 631.
94 36 Wis. 2d 480, 153 N.W.2d 510 (1967).
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terial. However harm may be apparent prior to the determina-
tion of the issue of negligence. . . .9 (emphasis added)
The court went on to say, following the reasoning of Kurz and the
trial court, that ". . . there was only a possibility that the false state-
ments of the insured would be used at the trial for impeachment pur-
poses and such possibility at the time the motion for summary judg-
ment was being decided did not warrant a finding of such harm as
ought to foreclose the third party from suing the insurance company."'
The court then quoted from Kurz, ". . . should such prior statements
be used for impeachment purposes at the trial of the instant case,
there could be no doubt of their materiality and of the consequent
breach of the cooperation clause."9 It should be noted that this specu-
lation fell within the realm of prejudice possibility, since the court
could only guess whether the statements would be used for impeach-
ment purposes. But the court felt a distinctive feature of the case was
that the statement of the driver's identity affected coverage. The in-
consistent statements of the insured forced the insurer into trying a neg-
ligence issue involving the insured as the driver, while at the same time
defending that the insured was not the driver. The court held that these
two positions were together indefensible. "To force Badger to forego
either defense in order to strengthen the other is harm and prejudice
within the meaning of a material breach of the cooperation clause as a
matter of law."98
The court recognized that the insurer was obliged to expose its
insured as a prevaricator of a material fact and to discredit him on
direct proof of a material issue. They determined that, under Kurz,
this constituted harm and prejudice to the insurance company because
it was placed in a position where it could not raise a legitimate de-
fense without discrediting its own witness. Under these circumstances,
the court said that it is:
"... immaterial which statement is false because if the case were
presented to a jury any verdict would be the result of and bear
the stamp of a fact, finding process the integrity of which has
been contaminated by inconsistent statements and incredibility of
the insured as a witness. The prejudice and harm to the insurer




The reasoning of Chief Justice Hallows in Schauf raises the basic
query whether an insured is not prejudiced when defending any case
95 Id. at 485, 153 N.W.2d at 513.
90 Id. at 486, 153 N.W.2d at 513.
97 Ibid.
98 Id. at 487, 153 N.W.2d at 513.
DD Id. at 488, 153 N.W.2d at 514.
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where the insured deliberately gives varying versions of the collision.
The insurer in such instances must risk impeachment of its insured
while defending the liability issues. Under present broad discovery
rules, statements of the insured given to insurer and attorney are
available to opposing counsel. If these statements conflict at trial, the
insured is discredited in the eyes of the jury. Perforce the insurer
is penalized in the preparation and defense of the case. As mentioned
in a relatively recent Missouri case:
... it needs no argument to sustain the proposition that insurer's
counsel would have been substantially prejudiced in a material
respect when at the trial of plaintiff's damage suit the credibility
of each of its two witnesses, . . . was impeached by their prior
sworn testimony contrary to their trial testimony.10
Must an insurer participate in a trial vouching for the veracity of
its insured on the liability issues, when it possesses evidence that he
is not believable? No trial lawyer relishes representation of the carrier
in those circumstances. Even though there is a strong public policy
interest in protecting the rights of an injured third party, presum-
ably within the limits of the fault doctrine,101 the elementary principle
that the law does not make a better contract for the parties than they
made for themselves must retain some vitality. As stated in a recent
Illinois case:
The courts cannot condone or support a doctrine that might
ultimately make the cost of insurance protection prohibitive.
Compliance with its terms [the contract] is therefore vital to
all who may benefit, either directly or indirectly, from its pro-
visions. For this reason we are of the opinion that strict com-
pliance is in the best interest of the public. .... 102 (emphasis
added)
Another eminent authority, commenting on the prejudice require-
ment, has stated:
Such a rule is probably salutary where it is evident that the
insured's infraction did not seriously impair the insurer's in-
vestigation or defense of the action. But if the rule is carried
to the point of imposing an almost insurmountable burden of
proving that the verdict was the result of the lack of coopera-
tion, it would amount to a perversion of such contractual pro-
vision. 0 3
Furthermore it should be remembered the third party is not "out-
of-pocket" in cases wherein recovery from the insured is denied since
the premiums were paid by the insured.
100 Quisenberry v. Kartsonis, 297 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Mo. 1956).
101 Miller, Preservation of the Doctrine of Fault, 35 Wis. BAR BULL. at 42 (Feb.
1962).
102 Gallaway v. Schied, 73 Ill. App. 2d 116, 219 N.E.2d 718, 722 (1966).
103 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4773, at 108 (1962).
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The liberal judicial policyo4 of paying third parties must be
weighed against the reality that the insurance contract necessarily im-
poses certain inescapable obligations upon the insured. These legal
duties will be enforced unless today's system of insuring motorists on
an underwriting-risk basis is to be completely abolished.
104 "Judges are more to be trusted as interpreters of the law than as expounders
of what is called public policy." Cave, J., In re Mirams, [1891] 1 Q.B. 594,
595.
